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myth"?

the Philippines a "political

in

United States exceeded its powers
and promised what it cannot perform in announcing to the nations
through its Peace Commissioners at Paris its policy "to maintain
With
in the Philippines an open door to the world's commerce"?
the near prospect of the restoration of normal conditions in the
On the answer to them
islands these become practical questions.
will depend our power to make our Asiatic possessions an aid to
the liberal trade policy which we in common with Great Britain are
trying to uphold in China, instead of having our presence in the
Orient a stumbling-block in our own commercial path and an irrithe

of the

tation to the rest of the world.

Those who hold that no separate

tariff for

the Philippines

possible base their opinion on the Constitutional provision
'

'

The

"To

congress shall have power

lay

and

common

duties, imposts

and excises

The

and excises;

to

pay the debts, and

defence and general welfare of the United States
shall

interpretation of this rule as applying to our

States under

;

but

all

be uniform throughout the United States."

sions requires the assumption,

meaning

:

collect taxes, duties, imposts

provide for the

is

:

first,

that

all

new

territories of the

posses-

United

conditions are within the United States in the

all

of the Constitution, and, secondly, that in the

view

of the

organic law the Philippines cannot possibly be differentiated from

Two

continental territory.

upon

to

uphold the

first

Supreme Court are relied
One is the dictum of Chief

cases in the

contention.

Arguing that Congress had power to
extend a general direct tax to the District of Columbia, the Chief

Justice Marshall^ in 1820.

Justice remarked
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"The

power, then, to lay and collect duties, imposts and excises may be exand must be exercised, throughout the United States. Does this term designate the whole or any particular portion of the American empire ? Certainly this
question can admit of but one answer.
It is the name given to our great Republic
which is composed of States and Territories."

ercised,

More

directly touching the Philippine tariff question

decision of the

Supreme Court ^ upholding the

under the United States

tariff,

establishment of a collection

Wayne
"

States.

in his

By the
And

commerce,
had passed

"The

it

opinion said

became

is

the

without action of Congress or the

district, in California in 1849.

Justice

:

ratifications of the treaty California

as there

is

collection of duties

became a part

of the

United

nothing differently stipulated in the treaty with respect to

instantly

bound and privileged by

the laws which Congress

revenue from duties on imports and tonnage.
right claimed to land foreign goods within the United States at any
to raise a

.

place out of a collection district,

if

.

.

allowed, would be a violation of that provision

which enjoins that
form throughout the United States."
in the Constitution

all duties,

imposts and excises shall be uni-

Cliange "California" to "the Philippines,"

it is said, and the
might be, if the Supreme Court, on
the case being presented to it, were to decide that with the transThere are many reasons
position that decision was still good law.
to believe, however, that on review the Court might hold that even
our continental territories were outside the United States of the
Constitution, and that its tariff applied to them from convenience
and not from necessity. And, even if it did not, it is still a far cry
from American California to the Asiatic Philippines.
From the first organisation of the Government Congress has
been treating territory as in one way or another outside the Constitution, governing it in violation of general provisions of the Constitution which are more fundamental and less limited as to time
and place than the tariff rule, and the Supreme Court itself has re-

open door

is

closed.

True,

it

peatedly upheld such practices.

The

original charter of the

February

United States Bank, approved on

authorised the directors to establish offices of
discount and deposit "wheresoever they shall think fit within the
United States." On the annexation of Louisiana they desired to
25, 1791,

New Orleans, but nobody considered that they
had the power to do so. By order of the House of Representatives the Committee of Ways and Means of that body drafted a bill
extending the bank's privileges, and on March 23, 1804, the Presi-

establish a branch in

dent signed the law authorising the directors
1
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"in any part of the territories or
United States." Possibly that was an unnecessary law, but it clearly reveals the views of the men who had a
hand in making the Constitution about its territorial application.
It shows, too, that the idea of "dependencies" could net have been
so foreign to "the Fathers" as their descendants sometimes suppose, since they, who were always splitting constitutional hairs and
living in daily fear of opening the door to tyranny, were willing to
contemplate "dependencies" in their laws.
The internal revenue laws under the Constitution are as universal and uniform in their application as the tariff laws, but it was
not until 1868 that they were by act of Congress ^ extended to apply
to all places "within the exterior boundaries of the United States."
A curious phrase that, suggesting an interior boundary beyond
which the enforcement of the revenue law is a matter of discretion.
The territories thus embraced by that act were the Indian reservations and the lands of the Civilised Tribes which the revenue collector had not before invaded.
But long before that an internal
boundary had been marked out for him. The first internal tax
on spirits distilled in the United States was levied by the act of
March 3, 1791, which, for the purpose of collection, ordered "that
the United States shall be divided into fourteen districts, each consisting of one State."
The Territories of the United States were
entirely neglected, though they had growing towns, and it was not
until 1798 that " The Annals of Congress" showed the existence of
a supervisor of internal revenue in Ohio.

The

of the original act
of the

constitutional rule for direct taxes, instead of requiring

uniformity, orders that they shall be "apportioned

among

the sev-

which may be included within this Union according to
their respective numbers."
This provision is apparently co-extensive with that concerning duties. If the makers of the Constitution
were so deeply concerned that the burden of indirect taxes should
be laid fairly on all, they must have been equally anxious that the
direct tax burden should be borne by all, after the method of apportionment, which was considered equitable in that case.
The
two clauses must be taken together, and the fact that the one in providing uniformity mentions the United States as a whole, and the
eral States

other in prescribing rules of proportion

among

the parts refers to

the area of taxation distributively, cannot be taken to
the tax limits in the two cases are different.

In the

mean

first

that

quarter

century of the Government's operation several direct taxes were
I
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and solely in the States. Finally one was extended to terriand in upholding it Chief Justice Marshall delivered his dictum, already referred to, defining " the American Empire." He
himself felt embarrassed by his own rule, and confessed difficulty
laid,

tory,

in reconciling a tariff necessarily operative in the Territories with a
direct tax operative there or not, at the discretion of Congress. He

contented himself with deciding that at any rate, even if Congress
was not obliged to tax the Territories, it had the power to do so,
and that was the point at issue before the Court. It would seem a
good deal more natural to suppose that if Congress had discretion
in the

one case

The

had

it

in the other.

original law for the collection of customs, passed July 31,

1789, divided the States into collection districts, but entirely
neglected the Territories. The only collector in the Western country was at Louisville, then in the State of Virginia, and his juris-

diction extended from the Falls of the

Southern

The

side.

territorial

bank

Ohio

mouth on the
was free for the
without a custom

to the

of that river

landing of goods without duty. \'ermont was left
house until its admission as a State, and so was Tennessee, but as
soon as either was admitted a port was established in it, evidently
out of scrupulous regard for the Constitution, which forbade preference to ports of one State over those of another. It was not until
1799 that the customs laws were put in force in any part of the

Northwest Territory.
When the Louisiana treaty came up for debate the preference
for French and Spanish vessels was attacked as unconstitutional.
Of course it was defensible as a reservation or "burden upon the
But having doubts of the power of the Government, even as
fee.'
a condition of acquirement, to give a privilege which did not har-

monise with the Constitution, the supporters

of the treaty preferred

defend the grant as concerning things outside the Constitution.
Congressman Nicholson, one of the leaders of the House whose

to

word carried weight, thus stated the Administration's position
"Whatever may

now

a State.

capacity, and

It

is

may

be the future destiny of Louisiana,

it

is

certain that

it

^
:

is

not

a territory purchased by the United States in their confederate
be disposed of by them at pleasure. It is in the nature of a

may be regulated without reference to the Constitution.
been the Island of Cuba, which was ceded to us under a similar condition of
admitting French and Spanish vessels for a limited time into the Havannah, could
it possibly have been contended that this would be giving a preference to the ports
of one State over those of another, or that the uniformity of duties, imposts and

colony whose commerce

Had

it

excises throughout the United States would have been destroyed
1
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p. 471.
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and

restrictions in the Constitution are to be strictly construed,

whether under a

strict

Natchez, which does not

to the port of

I

doubt

construction the very same indulgence might not be granted
lie

within any State, but in the territory of

the United States."

The judicial power of the United States is explicitly defined
by the Constitution, yet the courts in the Territories are and for
nearly a century have been organised without regard to the Constitution and clearly in violation of it
if they are under its control.
All the judicial power of the United States of the Constitution is
vested in courts whose judges hold office during good behavior,
and to them are committed certain functions which are exclusively
their own.
They cannot be alienated by Congress. Wherever the
Constitution runs no other courts are capable of receiving those
judicial powers which are reserved to the Federal courts, and which
they are commanded to assume.
As early as 1816 Justice Story
declared, with the concurrence of the whole Court
"No part of
the criminal jurisdiction of the United States can consistently with
the Constitution be delegated to State tribunals.
The admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction is of the same exclusive cognisance; and
it can only be in those cases where previous to the Constitution
State tribunals possessed jurisdiction independent of National authority that they can now constitutionally exercise a concurrent
Nevertheless in the Territories courts which were
jurisdiction."
not Federal courts, which were incapable of receiving Federal
jurisdiction, exercised jurisdiction of that "exclusive cognisance."
In 1828 the exercise of maritime jurisdiction by a Territorial court
of Florida was questioned, and in his argument to the Supreme
Court in defence of Territorial authority Daniel Webster said

—

^

:

:

no part of the United States. How can it be ? Howls it represented ?
Do the laws of the United States reach Florida ? Not unless
by particular provisions. The Territory and all within it are to be governed by the
acquiring power, except where there are reservations by the treaty.
Florida
was to be governed by Congress as she thought proper. What has Congress done?
She might have done anything she might have refused trial by jury and refused a
"

What

is

Florida

?

It is

.

.

.

—

Legislature."

Mr. Webster
the opinion, said

won

Chief Justice Marshall, writing

his case.

"^

" It has been contended that, by the Constitution, the judicial power of the
United States extends to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and that
the whole of this judicial power must be vested in one Supreme Court, and in
such inferior courts as Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish.
'

1
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Hence

it

has been argued that Congress cannot vest admiralty jurisdiction in courts

created by the Territorial Legislature.

"We

have only

to

pursue this subject one step further

provision of the Constitution does not apply to

it.

The

to

perceive that this

next sentence declares that

the judges both of the Supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during
good behavior.' The judges of the superior courts of Florida hold their offices for
These courts then are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial
four years.
power conferred by the Constitution on the general government can be deposited.

They

are incapable of receiving

it.

They

are legislative courts, created in virtue

which exists in the Government, or in virtue of
that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which
they are invested is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the third
article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress in the execution of those
general powers which that body possesses over the Territories of the United States.
Although admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the States in those courts only
which are established in pursuance of the third article of the Constitution, the
same limitation does not extend to the Territories. In legislating for them Congress exercises the combined powers of the general and of a State government.
of the general right of sovereignty,

"

Supreme Court reaffirmed this doctrine even more
and Justice Nelson made this broad statement about

In 1849 the
explicitly,

Territories
"

They

^

its complex
powers of government, as the organic law but are the creations
exclusively of the legislative department and subject to its supervision and control.
Whether or not there are provisions in that instrument which extend to and act
upon these Territorial governments it is not now material to examine."

are not organised under the Constitution, nor subject to

distribution of the

This

last

;

suggestion of an open question as to some shadowy

constitutional authorit}' over the Territories

is

particularly interest-

ing in view of Chief Justice Taney's persistent tendency to subject
the

government

of the Territories to the

The

checks of the Constitution

tariff opinion, which
was almost contemporary with Justice Nelson's, was written by
He was the man who persuaded the
Justice Wayne, of Georgia.
court in the Dred Scott case of the expediency of declaring that
Congress had no power to interfere with slavery in the Territories,
and he was the only member of it who fully concurred with Chief
Justice Taney's opinion. His pleading of the Constitution to justify
the California tariff, when it might equally well have been justified
as a general exercise of sovereignty, and probably would have been
by some other judge, is to be considered in the light of the proslavery policy of restricting the powers of the general government.
This culminated in the Dred Scott decision, denying that the power
"to make all needful rules and regulations" for the Territories ap-

for the protection of slavery.

iBenner

vs. Porter. 9

Howard

235.
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more than the old Northwest

plied to

Territory,

lOI

and holding that

other territory was impressed with a trust for Statehood and already
in anticipation subject to the constitutional

discretion.
in

Such

a contention

checks on administrative

makes the Government's whole course

dealing with the Louisiana Purchase, and even the Louisiana

treaty

A

unconstitutional.

itself,

theory of the Constitution which

inevitably reaches the conclusion that ever since 1804 the country

has treated that document as " blank paper," to recall the
constructionist Justice Campbell's sneer at Jefferson,

open

is

strict

certainly

to question and. suspicion.

In

many

details of

government the Constitution as a funda-

mental law for a United States larger than the States composing it
has been made blank paper by events.
It is well settled that the
constitutional guarantee of jury trial does not extend to actions in
the State courts.
It is equally well settled that it does extend to
all exercise of judicial power by the Federal Government of the
Constitution.

The

the government of the Territory of
drawn by Madison in co-operation

first bill for

Orleans, however, which was

with Jefferson and passed in 1804, restricted trial by jury to capital
cases in criminal prosecutions, entirely in violation of the Consti-

—

appointment of the Legisby the Senate,
though the Constitution requires the advice and consent of the
Senate to the appointment of specified functionaries "and all other
officers of the United States whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established bylaw." No
pretence was made in the debates that these legislators were "inferior officers " such as Congress could authorise the President or
heads of departments to appoint.
The establishment of this despotism did not pass unchallenged.
The bill was denounced as conferring "royal" powers. It was said
it did "not evince a single trait of liberty."
In the House of Representatives G. W. Campbell, of Tennessee, made an earnest contest for the jury trials and the courts of the Constitution, arguing
that "in legislating for the people of Louisiana" Congress was
"bound by the Constitution of the United States." A similar attempt at amendment was made in the Senate, but was voted down.
Among the majority were suoh men as John Breckenridge, of Kentucky, a champion of strict construction and the supposed author
of the famous Kentucky Resolutions
Timothy Pickering, of Massa
chusetts Jonathan Dayton, of New Jersey; Uriah Tracy, of Connecticut, and that stanch Jeffersonian, Wilson Carey Nicholas, of
tution

if it

applied.

It

also vested the

lative Council in the President, without confirmation

;

;
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Virginia

—a

who seemed

strange medley of Federalists and State Rights men,

on nothing about the Constitution except that
Indeed, the prevailing opinion
through the whole course of Louisiana legislation was strongly in

it

to agree

did not apply to the Territories.

that direction.

Many more
gress to bring

scruples were entertained about the right of Con-

new peoples within

and not rule them as
from the Constitution

the operation of the Constitution,

about any obligation arising
govern territory, regardless of ex-

colonists, than
to

itself

Much was

pedienc}^, according to its specific provisions.

both houses

of the treaty

said in

guarantees of constitutional privileges,

and the Louisiana bill was attacked as not keeping the promise to
France to incorporate the Territor}^ into the Union as soon as might
be consistent with the principles of the Constitution. The Jeffersonian philosophers of liberty anxiously debated among themselves
the duty of the United States to live up to its own ideals of free-

dom.

But the suggestion that

thumb

application of a compact

little

credit even

strictly in

its

among

those

it

must

live

up

to

them by

a rule of

made for a union of States found
who construed that instrument most

relation to States.

Caesar A. Rodney's declaration^

"does not

limit or restrain the authority of

that the Constitution

Congress with respect to Territories, but vests them with full and
complete power to exercise a sound discretion generally on the subject," was echoed by many other debaters.
This same question came up with reference to Florida in 1822.
The bill was modelled on that of Orleans in its administrative features, and contained a section forbidding the Territorial government to transgress the personal rights guaranteed to the people of
the States by the Constitution.
Mr. Montgomery, of Kentucky,
tried to substitute a clause that all the principles of the Constitu-

and all the prohibitions to legislation, as well with respect to
Congress as the Legislatures of the States, be "declared to be
applicable to the said Territory, as paramount acts." This was
voted down, and the following is Benton's comment on the incition

dent

-

"This prompt rejection of Mr. Montgomery's proposition shows what the
Congress of 1822 thought of the right of Territories to the enjoyment of any part
of the Constitution of the United States.
The only question between Mr.
Montgomery's proposition and the clause already in the bill was as to the tenure by
which these rights should be held whether under the Constitution of the United
.

—

1

-

Annals of Congress.

i8o3-'o4, p. 513.

Benton's Abridgement,

\'ol.

VII, p. 295, note.
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And the decision was
and the treaty. Thus a direct issue was made
between constitutional rights on one hand and the discretion of Congress on the
other in the government of this Territory, and decided promptly and without debate (for there was no speech after that of Mr. Rea on either side) against the ConYou shall have these
stitution.
It was tantamount to the express declaration:
principles which are in the Constitution, but not as a constitutional right nor even
as a grant under the Constitution, but as a justice flowing from our discretion, and
States or under a law of Congress and the treaty of cession.
that they should be held under the law

'

;

as an obligation

imposed by the treaty which transferred you

to our sovereignty.'"

Justice Story, in his commentaries,^ has thus stated this doctrine

:

"

The power

versal,

and

of Congress over the public territory

their legislation

clearly exclusive

is

subject to no control, but

is

is

and uni-

absolute and unlimited,

it is affected by stipulations in the cessions or by the ordinance of
under which any part of it has been settled."

unless so far as
1787,

A host of Supreme Court decisions laying down this law with
some reservations might be cited. When those reservations are
quoted in support of constitutional restraint on Territorial lawmaking it is to be remembered that the Constitution, as well as the
general laws of the United States, are in force by legislation in the
Territories.
It is indeed curious that Congress should have made
the Constitution into a law for the Territories,

if

that Constitution

governed them, but it has done so time and time again in
particular cases, and finally summed up these enactments generally
in Section 1,891 of the Revised Statutes, which declares
of itself

:

"

The

Constitution and

applicable shall have the

and

in

all

same

laws of the United States which are not locally
force

and

effect within all the

in-

organised Territories

every Territory hereafter organised as elsewhere within the United States.

Thus

'

the open question of Justice Nelson's time has been prac-

and the Supreme Court has for years been declaring
fundamental personal rights guaranteed by the
Constitution belong to the inhabitants of the Territories. In some
cases undoubtedly the opinions tend to uphold the view that the
so-called Bill of Rights and the general limitations of the Constitution by their own force extend to the Territories. But even while
conceding these rights the Supreme Court often shows a tendency
to do so merely on the theory that the old Anglo-Saxon "law of
the land " protects all within the range of government from tyranny
and injustice.

tically closed,

as a fact that the

Thus

Justice Bradley- says:

"Doubtless Congress in
those fundamental limitations
1

Section, 1328.

would be subject
which are formulated

legislating for the Territories
in favor of personal rights
2

Mormon Church
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United States,

136,

U. S.

i.

to

in
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the Constitution

and

its

amendments; but these

limitations

would

exist,

rather by

inference and the general spirit of the Constitution from which Congress derives

powers, than by any other express and direct application of

all its

its

provisions.'

officer of our Government, owing
must exercise his functions in harmony with the
spirit of our institutions, with what Justice Matthews^ called "the
principles of constitutional liberty which restrain all the agencies
of government. State and National." But that does not compel the
It

may

be conceded that every

to its very nature,

application to Territories of particular rules of administration

made

by States for the government of States in their united capacit}^
And it should be remembered in construing these rules that, however much the country may have grown and the idea of a broader
nationality developed, the framers of the Constitution formed a gov-

ernment for States and committed the territory or other property
which might fall to the general government to its complete discreSo those who first added new
tion, with a general grant of power.
territory understood and acted, though they were strict constructionists and theoretical democrats.
Perhaps the Louisiana legislation ought to have been declared
unconstitutional.
But if so, what is to be said of the condemnation to death or imprisonment without jury trial of American citizens by Ministers and Consuls for crimes committed at places constructively made American territory for that purpose by treaty with
foreign governments? There is no constitutional warrant for it. If
trial by jury is a right of all men subjected to the authority of the
United States, is it not as much their right in a consulate at Yokohama as in a courthouse at Santa Fe ? The Supreme Court has
It has
frankly cut this Gordian knot since it could not untie it.
said- that though a private American vessel is constructively American territory, yet an offence on it can be punished by a consid
without jury trial, for "By the Constitution, a Government is ordained and established for the 'United States of America' and not
The Constitution can have
for countries outside their limits.
no operation in another country."
The rule of uniformity in taxation of what is essentially one
people is so manifestly advisable that nobody would wish to change
But in view of all the excepit or even open the door to change.
.

tions

made

in practice to the

.

.

necessary application of the Constitu-

home Territories, and the political purpose, which about
demanded limitation of the power over them, it is a violent

tion to the

1850

I

Murpliy

vs.

Ramsey,

11+ U. S. 15.

2

in re Ross, 140 U. S. 453.
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assumption to assert that a rule laid down in one particular case
then would be literally and slavishly applied to overturn a deliberate policy of the Government formed to meet utterly different conditions which the Court did not and could not foresee.
The Supreme Court itself in the California tariff decision intimated as much.
It noted that California was part of the United
States by treaty, and it found nothing in the treaty to differentiate
it from the rest of the United States.
The California treaty did
promise to incorporate the Territory into the Federal Union, and
naturally judges with the ''trust for Statehood " idea in mind would
give that promise immediate effect so far as they were concerned
with government under it.
The fact that they consulted the treaty
to learn

the Territory's status with reference to the Constitution

implies that even this State Rights Court would have regarded a
treaty for acquiring a

dependency

as giving the acquisition quite a

different character.

In that respect the Philippines hold an entirely distinct rela-

government.

tion to the general

They

are not by treaty taken ac-

The United

tually or prospectively into the Union.

simply assumed possession of the Philippines.
as all the Federalists, and,

indeed,

many

It

of the

States has

holds them, just

Republicans, be-

The narrow concould alone hold Louisiana.
struction which denied the jxiwer of expansion for assimilation has
lieved in 1803

it

been outgrown.
similar

Nor

is

bond

of

Certainly,

it

there anything

new

Court has ever hesitated

ments

too late to bind the country in a

an opposite extreme.

Neither Congress nor the Supreme

to recognise

anomalies.

to

or startling in the idea of dependencies

outside the United States.

administrative

is

narrow construction carried

and provide

for territorial

and

The Louisiana and Florida govern-

w^ere, as

has been seen, utterly inconsistent with the Con-

The

Indians, with their separate laws in States and

stitution.

Territories,

have ever been anomalies, and

dealing quite

Our

unhampered with Orientals

offer a

precedent for

as their needs

extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised

may require.

by Federal

officers

since 1848 has no warrant in the Constitution for an\' Ignited States
of the Constitution.

Congress did not hesitate

to

legislating for the United States

Later, in 1S56,
Islands,

which

at

it

made laws

use the word "dependencies"'

in

Bank.
for the

government

sidered as appertaining to the United States.'

Guano
"be con-

of the

the discretion of the President might

In other words,

they were territory of the United States w'hich was not within

it.
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Finally, the Xlllth

Amendment

to

the Constitution declares

that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude "shall exist within

The

the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction."

men who drew
doctrine of

and won

had been through the slavery contest, knew the
limited power in the Territories, and had repudiated it,
this

their case in war.

own contention

They passed

the

Amendment

in the

from
any territory which Congress ruled or might rule outside the United

light of their

to assure the exclusion of slavery

States of the Constitution.

The supposition that the term United States in that instrument
means more than the government over the States united requires
its use in two utterly different meanings without
any indication of the difference. Thus it must be said that the
"people of the United States" who make and amend the Constitution are people of States, but the United States for which the preamble says they make the Constitution is the whole "American
Empire " that the United States of the Judiciary Article means

the assumption of

;

only States, but of the Tariff Article
dencies over which the Government

all

the territories or depen-

may extend

its rule.

And

that

and implied definition in the Xlllth Amendment of that term in the narrower significance.
Such a restricted meaning is fully in accord with common
sense.
Who thinks of the Philippines as being in the United
States? They are manifestly no part of the system for which our
Constitution was made.
The belief that the Constitution must of
necessity apply to the home Territories, in spite of evidence that
the founders and early rulers had no such thing in mind, is due in
its present form largely to the feeling of continental interest and
common American nationality. The interpretation of the Constitution as a fundamental law for Asiatic islands simply because this
country is called upon to rule them is no proper development of
that idea of the American Nation. "The Constitution can have no
operation in another country," and the Philippines, even though
we control them, are another country, physically, morally, socially
and commercially.
in face of the final use

the
for

The reversal of the California tariff decision is not essential to
"open door." The reasons for questioning the law it laid down
this continent are cited only to show clearly how little ground

there

is in

stretching

the circumstances of
its

gency which
tie the hands

meaning
its

of

its

to forbid a

delivery,

and

in

our history, for

Government policy

authors never contemplated.

Government with reference

in

an emer-

Courts do not thus

to particular situations
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which cannotlbe foreseen. In a constitution, as Story says, "there
ought to be a capacity to provide for future contingencies as they
inimitable in their nature, so it
may happen, and as these are
.

is

.

.

impossible safely to limit that capacity."
It

has not been limited in this country.

spite of being written,

is

mobile.

It

The

Constitution, in

never would have been adopted

had been known to those
had been understood as an indisThose who
soluble compact instead of a voidable association.
thought it made blank paper by the changed interpretations circumstances forced were merely victims of the tendency to limit by
one day's conceptions the power of meeting another's needs. Some
American trader may follow the example of the plaintiff in the Caliif

its

meaning

who drew

it,

to the present generation

if,

for instance,

it

fornia case, and strive to avoid duties at Manila, or
interest

may

some Spanish

seek, regardless of this country's welfare, to close the

door to the world's commerce in the Philippines. But it is scarcely
conceivable that either could overturn in those distant islands,
which have nothing in common with this country and are not a part
of its industrial system, a considered policy of the United States
with reference to international relations, by invoking a disputed
constitutional doctrine, which, even

United States

of

America."

if

true, is true

only for "the

